UNITED LODGE OF THEOSOPHISTS
BANGALORE CITY.
LIBRARY COPY

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XVII JUNE 1946 No. 6

WOMEN AND INDIAN VILLAGES

[**F. L. Brayne, I. C. S.** (Retired), has been Commissioner for Rural Reconstruction in the Panjab and has done most excellent work for the uplift of Indian villages. He is the author of *Better Villages, The Remaking of Village India* and *Socrates in an Indian Village.* These works should be in the hands of every educationist and reformer in India. In this essay he not only envisages the work for village women, to be done mostly by women, but also draws a most attractive picture of what can be achieved by proper self-education and patient striving by Indian youths of both sexes. It is a fundamental and vital question which an able, sincere and experienced labourer in the field of village uplift examines here with clearly thought out plans lucidly presented.—ED.]

Twenty or more years ago, the Belgian Minister for the Interior read a paper before the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome and convinced a rather sceptical audience that, in a country of peasant farmers, the housewife was responsible for at least two-thirds of the important things of village life. This is logical and should be obvious in all countries and certainly in India. The man has three things to do: (1) Conduct his farming or his handicraft efficiently and bring home his earnings; (2) keep the village clean; and (3) keep the peace.

The housewife does most of the rest. She is responsible for the balancing of the domestic budget, for the clothing and feeding of the family, the upbringing of the future citizens and the making of a nice home. *The home is the centre of the nation and the woman is the centre of the home.* If her home and family are healthy and happy, and her children well-trained, the nation will be free from crime, peaceful and happy.

One of the greatest obstacles to progress in India is the waste of money which should either be put by in savings for the general development of the country or be ploughed back into farm, industry, home, health and education. Instead, it

is lost in litigation and faction, in extravagant social ceremonies and in gold and silver ornaments.

Between 1890 and 1930, about 2,000 crores of rupees left India to buy silver and gold. Just think of the increase in India's wealth, health and well-being if all that money had gone into wells, orchards, workshops, better homes and better villages or had been available for canals, railways and industries. But no, the women wanted ornaments, and ornaments they got—plus ill-health, poverty and squalor.

I have addressed many meetings of men, and I have suggested simple and obvious social reforms. But although they all agreed with me about their desirability, they would never promise to put them in force, because they knew they must consult their wives first. We men are very brave outside our homes, but we know who is the master of the home. *Custom and tradition are in the hands of the women and it is their sanction which is required before any change can be made.* The Nani and the Dadi (Grandmothers and mothers-in-law etc.) still have great power in the home. We train boys and we train men and they all slip back—because we have forgotten to train their wives, mothers and sisters, and it is they who are really responsible for the new things which we wish to see established in the homes of India.

Reformers say that villagers want only better cattle, better crops, freedom from debt and so on. They laugh at the idea of giving villagers radio, pictures and culture. They say that all the villagers want is bread. A more disastrous mistake was never made. Better farming, better sanitary measures and all the other things are only means to an end. The end is better and healthier homes but, as all these things require much work and sacrifice, a very strong incentive must be provided before the villagers will do this extra work. Moreover all this work will be impermanent if it is done for its own sake alone and not for the sake of achieving a higher standard of home life.

We have, therefore, to inspire the villager with the ideal of a better home and for this purpose, along with better crops and so on, we must provide a very strong cultural motive—nice homes and happy, healthy children. The neglect of this important psychological fact has been the main cause of the slowness of our progress and of our complaints of the villagers' apathy. Of course the villager is apathetic; until he has good reason why should he work and save and scrape? Give him ideals which he understands and appreciates and he will never stop working. The Eastern proverb still holds good: "Man shall not live by bread alone."

But where must the ideal of a better home be implanted? Why, in the *gharwali*, the housewife, of course, as she and she only is responsible for the home and it is the neglect of the welfare and training of the women that has caused such

stagnation in all uplift work.

Until the women can teach their children clean and regular habits, self-control, self-respect and the fear of God, how can we hope for any lessening of the curse of litigation, false evidence and bribery? How can we get good citizens with high standards of honesty, work and craftsmanship? How can we start a savings movement, without which India can have neither social security nor the capital for the development she needs, until the mothers can teach the first lessons of thrift and self-denial to their little children?

All the post-war plans for India are aimed at raising the standard of living of the people, but unfortunately the present plans include no direct attack upon the standard of living. They are only concerned with creating an environment—economic and hygienic—in which a rise in the standard of living will be possible.

The standard of living is the standard of the home. All plans, therefore, must start from and be built round the home. What do we want the home to look like? Having settled that, how can we make a hundred million homes look like this dream of India's ideal home?

To raise the actual standard of living we must first make up our minds exactly and in full detail what we mean by a higher standard. We must then bring that picture to every home in the land. The men must be so inspired with the beauty of the picture that they will do the working and planning, both individually and co-operatively, and the saving and scraping, necessary to achieve the new standard.

But the home is in charge of the women. The best the men can do is to produce the raw material and the money and create the environment in which the women can make their homes perfect. The women, however, are at present in complete ignorance of what can be done to improve home and health. This means that our first and basic plans must be for the proper education of the girls and for the domestic training of the grown-up women who are too late for school life. This means a network of domestic training schools, provincial schools for the training of staff, and district tahsil and taluk schools for those women who can spare the time to come for short courses. For those who cannot leave the village are needed touring teams of trained women, spending a month in one village to teach the women the elements of home work and then going on to another village, leaving behind them a Co-operative Women's Better Homes Society to consolidate and continue the work.

Every school and college must teach domestic work and every degree and diploma, for whatever subject, must include a very practical domestic test which no student can avoid. If ever girls' education is to be general India must follow the rest of the world and make the village school co-educational up to the lower middle standard, with

female as well as male teachers. And to ensure that the girls shall have their fair share of what education is available, the boys must not be allowed to outnumber the girls by more than an agreed percentage.

Medical and maternity aid goes without saying. At present there are practically no women doctors in the village and maternity arrangements are best left undescribed. The women must have their Co-operative movement, staffed with women from Provincial Registrar to village worker. And of course the women must have a welfare service of women with staff at all levels from the village to the seat of Government.

To do all this work will require an army of trained women which will take years to collect and train. But until it is done India will not take her proper place among the nations of the world.

Meanwhile our plans must create the environment in which health, happiness and prosperity are possible. The large-scale planning we need not touch upon. That is all necessary and must be carried out, but it will fall flat and fail of its purpose unless the intimate domestic environment of every family and of every hamlet is so improved that the people can appreciate the value, and co-operate in the execution, of the large-scale planning.

To effect this improvement requires an intensive programme of simple homely "uplift." This will cost little in cash but will require the greatest enthusiasm, initiative, co-ordination, drive and sincerity from the very top through all classes of officials and non-officials down to the humblest villager and the pettiest public servant.

The programme will transform the village. It includes ventilators, improved cooking ranges with chimneys to take away the smoke, hay-boxes to take the place of dung-cake fires, flowers in the little compounds, paved and drained streets, improved wells, providing pure water and comfortable sanitary surroundings. All waste water from home, wash place, well and place of worship will run to patches of vegetables, flowers and fruit-trees. Manure pits, properly sited, will be dug and used, and a simple type of latrine constructed for women and children as well as for men.

The uplift programme must be "sold" by a publicity campaign on a scale hitherto undreamt of, using every device and method, ancient and modern, Eastern and Western, and it must also attract and teach the women as well as the men. The radio programme, for instance, will include a women's hour; the village picture paper will have a women's page. There will be Girl Guides, as well as Boy Scouts, a Co-operative Women's Institute, touring lecturers, cinemas and magic lanterns. All shows and exhibitions will have a women's section. The women will be taught exactly how to run a home, make and mend clothes, bring up and train children, just as the

men are taught farming and animal husbandry. And just as the men have village guides to teach them the simple things they should know and to serve as a link between them and the departmental officials, so will the women have their female guides, one for every 1,000 homes, to bring the gospel of a healthier, happier life to them and their children and to link them with the Women's services.

This is how the country must be prepared for the big plans to come, and this is how the people, women as well as men, must be inspired to do the hard work and to undertake the self-denial without which the villages of India will never become the lovely places they should be and the happy homes of healthy, prosperous citizens.

What is the alternative? *What will happen if we continue to try to develop India by "men only,"* neglecting one half, and that the more important half, of the population? The answer is failure and frustration and the continuation of the present lop-sided system whereby one wheel of the chariot of progress is firmly locked and the chariot goes round in circles. Every generation, instead of starting where the last left off, will start from the base line, because the mothers have learnt nothing new to pass on to their children.

There is an even more grim fate in store for us if we continue to neglect the centre of the home and therefore to prevent any real rise in the standard of living.

The problem of post-war development in India is a race between the rising tide of population and the standard of living. Can the standard of living be raised so quickly and so high that it will seriously affect the birth-rate—as it invariably has in other countries—before the increasing population swallows up all possibility of raising the standard of living?

This race should have started after the great War but, although one competitor, the population, was already running strongly, the other did not even begin to train. Economic improvements were made but it was not realised that *economic improvement by itself will not raise the standard of living.* Increased wealth brings luxuries and extravagances and vices in plenty, and undoubtedly a partial rise in certain standards, but it requires very careful planning and not a little discipline and self-sacrifice to raise the general standard of living and, having raised it, to maintain it at its new level in spite of the up's and down's of agriculture and industry.

The standard of living is the standard of the home and the standard of the home is the standard of the woman in charge of the home. If, therefore, we want to raise the standard of living, the health, comfort, education, training and happiness of the women must be given first as much attention as large-scale planning. As long as the homes of the common people remain as they

are and the women live and produce and bring up their children in their present conditions of ignorance, discomfort, ill-health, suffering and squalor, so long will the standard of living be low and the increasing population continue to reduce the possibilities of improvement.

F. L. BRAYNE

MORAL VALUES

A new world is arising, but what kind of social order it will show forth depends on the builders. One fact is ominous: Moral principles are not valued at their true worth; and arrangements, pacts and treaties are made in terms of money, raw commodities, oil and rubber. Moral principles are creators of peace, order, rhythm; material things are wombs of war unless valued as the mere appanages of the moral order which they truly are.

The ancient doctrine of Maya teaches that things are illusory when the values given to them are inaccurate; it is wrong to overvalue things as the ordinary world does; it is equally wrong to undervalue them, as false pietists and ascetics do. "The soul of things is sweet," taught the great Buddha; non-recognition of that soul turns the world sour or bitter. At important international gatherings there is an ove-remphasis on material things and the standard of living so much talked about is considered from a very materialistic point of view.

There is, however, an undercurrent of moral force working and we must never lose hope that its leaven will raise the whole level of perception. One factor which confuses the common mind is the mistaking of creedalism for religion. Not from church or synagogue, from temple or mosque, will the Moral Voice arise, nor must we mistake the voice of the masses for the voice of God. There are, nevertheless, numerous human hearts lighted by moral fervour and knowledge of the right, and on them we must rely. When that heart of the race speaks clearly and unequivocally race deliverance will be at hand.

LIBERTY TO LIVE

[Many of our readers must remember with appreciation **Shrimati Lila Ray's** admirable study of the implications of Gandhiji's spinning-wheel, which appeared in our October 1944 issue under the title "'According to His Work.'" She brings to this study the same lucid perception of essentials, the same sureness of touch, painting against the clearly sketched ideological background, historical and present, Gandhiji's economic solution in its fundamental simplicity and promise.—ED.]

Mutable and various are the ways of men, diverse and multiple the institutions whereby they seek to secure their liberty to live. The assumption that capitalism and socialism with their corollaries, fascism and communism, exhaust the possible social arrangements betrays little faith in the ingenuity of the human race and a lamentable ignorance of its many-faceted history. Pushing aside these great popular placards for the moment, let us look carefully at what lies behind them. There is less consistency in the societies they purport to describe than partisan observers would have us believe. Social aristocracy, political democracy and economic plutocracy creak uneasily together in England while in America social and political democracy are combined with economic plutocracy. Social democracy with political and economic oligarchy forms a new pattern in Russia. The fascist pattern in Germany was economic plutocracy and political oligarchy with only partial social democracy. In Italy we find social aristocracy, political oligarchy and economic plutocracy. The French arrangement resembles the American. In India we have social aristocracy (inclusive of racial) with political and economic oligarchy. If we carry our investigations farther, examining the structures of the great civilisations of the past which have perished, like those of Greece and Rome and Egypt, or that have survived, like those of India and China, and go afield with the anthropologist as well, the variety and richness of human institutions will both bewilder and delight us.

Yet only a few of the possible social patterns have been tried, for such experimenting must of necessity be carried out over long periods of time. Arrangements are tested slowly and rejected or preserved as their inadequacies and their merits reveal themselves. Through family, tribe, clan, race and nation, through matriarchy, patriarchy, polygamy, monogamy and polyandry, through chattel, serf and wage slavery, through theocracy, democracy, autocracy, aristocracy, bureaucracy, plutocracy, oligarchy, monarchy and anarchy, man has striven and is

striving to find a satisfactory way of securing his liberty to live and the institutions that best preserve it. Through all these mutations the anthropologist discerns man to whom nothing *human* is foreign. Present everywhere are the basic traits of the psychic make-up of the human being. Apart from specific cultural baggage man is not different from what he was thousands of years ago. His culture is only the apparatus by which he fits himself into his surroundings in order to live. All that he has ever said, done, thought or made has been built on the impulse to live. Singly and collectively he has consistently sought what is of the greatest interest and value to himself—life and liberty.

What do we mean by life and what by liberty ? Life, I think all will agree, is not something static and tangible that can be done up with ribbons and presented by the state to the individual in a neat package along with a pamphlet of instructions as to how to make the best use of it. Watching it in the home, field and laboratory we realise it is a process of growth, outward and inward. Inwardly and outwardly the activity of the living thing under observation expands. Under favourable conditions the point of maximum expansion advances and this is especially true of inner growth, for the inner man, possessing greater plasticity than the outer, consequently has greater potentialities. Inner growth is not circumscribed like physical growth. It attains its point of maximum expansion only when man attains the maximum mastery in the exercise of his human powers, when he has liberated himself from all disabling limitations and freed himself from his own incapacities, in *mukti*. For the destiny of man is, not illogically, manhood. Only when we have achieved it can we think of becoming supermen or anything else. It is not as easy as one would think.

Life, we have said, is a process. A process must have an object, a purpose. We cannot pass from one state or place to another without going through a process of getting there. Similarly we cannot pass through a process if there is nowhere to go. Then what is the object of the life process ? Or, in other words, what do we live for ? What do we hope to become or to get that makes life worth living ? We hope to become and to possess what seems to us desirable. No one is more interested in our own well-being than we are ourselves. No one cares more whether we live or die. And no one, in the full possession of his senses, deliberately seeks or desires what he knows to be injurious to himself. Even ascetics and martyrs who voluntarily undergo great suffering derive the strength to do so from the vision of a greater good to which they hope that their endurance and their fortitude will bring them. And the most ordinary man and woman, as Mill says, has means of knowledge with respect to his own feelings, desires, needs

and circumstances immeasurably surpassing that which can be possessed by any one else. That all men want the good or what they find good is a hard, inescapable fact. This puts us in a position to define life. We can now see it as the process of realising and expanding our latent powers (our growth potential) in the pursuit of what we perceive to be good.

What then is liberty? Obviously, it is the freedom to choose the way of life which suits our purpose and by following which we can live and grow according to our human nature. "It is essential," writes Joad in *Liberty To-day*, "that the individual be allowed freely to choose for himself the kind of good life in pursuit of which his nature will find its appropriate fulfilment. There is not one good life for all." Man's ideas of what is good and what is not, his powers of discrimination and judgement, evolve through trial and error. The freedom to make mistakes is as vital to his development as any. Corrigibility is a distinguishing *human* characteristic, stemming from man's power of delaying and modifying his reactions, the source also of his ability to learn and to think. Merely to do and die is not manly; to question why, is.

Liberty is usually defined in negative terms as the absence of restraint. It is thought of as an elaborate code of rights, natural and civil. The very conception of "rights," as Tom Paine made clear, is negative, for it assumes an antecedent act of usurpation by which the sovereignty that vests in the associating parties has been misappropriated. That sovereignty has to be recovered from the usurpers by persuasion or by force, piecemeal or entire. The pieces are called "rights." Too often they are sops thrown to the many-mouthed mob.

Now liberty does not exist in what is usually described as a state of nature. One man working alone to supply all his needs has no liberty for he has no choice of a way of life. Robinson Crusoe had either to live as he did or to die. In a less congenial climate he could not even then have survived long. Only the existence of the human world enables the anchorite to scorn it.

When two work together, a measure of liberty is won. A man may content himself with hunting, a woman with cooking. The necessary labour is also accomplished in less time and both parties gain leisure. That is important, for the twenty-four hours of the day cannot be lengthened or shortened at will and what we achieve by way of civilisation must be achieved in that short span of time. When a hundred people work together all of them individually gain proportionate liberty. All men need not hunt nor all women cook. Some can build houses, some can spin and weave. Some can carve, some can write, some can plough. Some can cook *and* sing, build *and* hunt, for more work is accomplished in less time and each member of the community

has individually more leisure.

The primary purpose for which men associate is thus seen to be liberty. They cannot have it unless they live in association with each other. Even freedom of speech is impossible without someone to speak to. *Each man finds in other men not the limitation of his liberty but its realisation.* Man does not enter society to be less free than he was before but to gain liberty and to secure that liberty. Human life is maintained by reciprocity, not by destruction ; the wider the reciprocity the greater the liberty and the richer the life. There is no inherent or irreconcilable conflict between the individual and the group.

Lord Acton said that liberty itself was the end of all government. To say that any people is not fit to be free is to say that they choose to go unclothed, to die of starvation and diseases bred of starvation and to see their children naked and dying of starvation and diseases bred of starvation. It is to say they prefer to go without medical aid and without education, that they prefer poverty and death to prosperity and life. Does any one dare say that those who died in their hundreds of thousands in the Bengal famine of 1943 and in the Nazi concentration camps died because they were free to live ?

" Your President, " said Gandhi to Louis Fischer in 1942, " talks about the Four Freedoms. Do they include the freedom to be free ? "

The problem is to find a form of association which will actually make the free development of each the condition of the free development of all, which, while securing to each that freedom, will defend it and protect him with the whole common force. Such is our world that the obvious, right, simple thing appears to be the most difficult to accomplish. Tom Paine wrote bluntly, "...make governments what they should be and they will defend themselves." The defence question is much exaggerated. People are easily quietened by it into the acceptance of something less than their due. The atom bomb makes no fundamental difference. It is only a question of degree. The game is the same though the stakes have been raised. Where and when the community is the realisation and fulfilment of the individual liberty of each of its members, men will voluntarily defend it with their lives and brains. Where the community is not that, conscription and a standing army and atom bombs will be necessary.

The community has always represented the liberty of some of its members and they have been its defenders. Where large armies are needed they provide the commanders. The number has varied with the social pattern, being smallest in despotism and largest in democracy, smaller in aristocracy and larger in oligarchy. In none of the great modern societies do all have liberty. Partial liberty cannot content any people permanently. Monarchy,

aristocracy, oligarchy and the rest, where and when they have existed, have been tolerated not because they were good in themselves but because at a historical moment they may have happened to be the lesser of several evils. In their inception they have been arrangements for mutual protection but have hardened into tyrannies on the one hand and slaveries on the other, replacing liberty by licence, duty by privilege.

Democracy, which is the nearest we have got to the solution of our problem, is regarded by many as a failure and other expedients are being sought. Political democracy has not worked as well as expected chiefly because it has been combined with economic plutocracy, having been instituted at a time when people had not become as conscious of the working of economic forces as we are today. Now we know economic plutocracy and political democracy are incompatible. The assumptions behind them are contradictory. The contradiction can be resolved either by the suppression of democracy or the supersession of plutocracy. The first means political retrogression, the second, an economic revolution involving the abolition of capitalism. Fascism rescued capitalism from the dilemma by suppressing democracy and keeping economic relationships unchanged. Communism changed the economic relationships from those of a plutocracy to those of an oligarchy and suppressed political democracy as well. For the dictatorship of the proletariat *is* a dictatorship, the dictatorship of an oligarchy. It was regarded, by both Marx and Lenin, not as desirable but as unavoidable in the transition to a classless society. They overlooked the fact that no dictatorship ever dare abdicate. In England socialism is now attempting to pass from a plutocratic to an oligarchic economy while retaining political democracy and social aristocracy.

Another attempt at a solution is being made by Mahatma Gandhi. His approach to the problem, aimed likewise at the supersession of plutocracy, is very different. Reviewing the history of feudalism Lord Acton wrote: "When men found a way of earning their livelihood without depending for it on the good-will of the class that owned the land, the landowner lost much of his importance and it began to pass to the possessors of movable wealth." Now when men find a way of earning their livelihood without depending for it on the good-will of the class or the state that owns the instruments of production, the capitalist and the state will lose much of his and its importance and that importance will begin to pass back to the producers. Gandhi has found it. Lenin, acting on the suggestion of Marx and Engels, converted plutocratic ownership of the means of production into state ownership. But that ownership became important only when instruments of production attained a size and a price that precluded their ownership and

operation by individuals or small groups. The capture of the state assumed overwhelming importance when it came to mean the capture of the ownership of the means of production.

Gandhi's procedure is to put into the hands of men instruments of production that are small, light, cheap and as efficient as modern technical knowledge can make them, which they can both operate and own, thus transforming mass production into production by the masses, the proletarian into the independent producer, incidentally abolishing the labour market. This way a point can be reached when capitalists will find themselves with large unprofitable holdings on their hands, and most of their importance gone. The present crisis in world society will have been by-passed. The state will shrink to its normal size, its pathological swelling will subside. Its normal healthy function as the servant, not the master, of man will be restored. This is the "withering away" of the state which Marx desired and Lenin hoped would come to pass, how or when they did not and could not know. One thing is certain. It will be, in the words of Gandhi, "infinitely superior to anything we have now." It is economic democracy. With social and political democracy, it makes a new social arrangement, completing the democratic pattern. Call it "total" democracy if you must. It is not totalitarian. Let us see how much nearer it brings us to our goal, to what extent it can make man, not money or land, the measure and master of all things.

LILA RAY

A NEW WORLD

"Our materialistic confidences have betrayed us," writes Ralph Tyler Flewelling editorially in his Winter 1946 *Personalist* (U. S. A.) "Dead Worlds" is his theme—"the world of security," "the world of national isolationism," "the world of segregated races, religions and cultures" and, "most tragic of our dead worlds...the lost world of faith."

"Faith in righteousness, justice and truth as the fundamental realities of human relations" has yielded place to the belief that peace and prosperity are matters of social organisation, of universal education, of full employment, of higher living standards.

> We need to turn from faith in synthetic products as the sources of a new world, from washing machines, automobiles and helicopters on every roof, to the certainties which make living endurable and worth while.... In face of everything to the contrary there must come new faith in the intrinsic worth of man, a new faith in peace, in righteousness, and in God.

"A great resurgence of moral integrity" is indeed the need but it will never come so long as men look on themselves primarily as makers and users of gadgets instead of as Gods in the making. "Where there is no vision, the people perish."

THE ORIGIN AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF MUSLIM THOUGHT

[**Prof. M. M. Sharif,** M. A. (Cantab.), Chairman of the Department of Philosophy in the Aligarh Muslim University, presided over the Trivandrum Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress late in December 1945. We are privileged to give our readers the following extracts from his most interesting presidential address. The first Muslim to preside over that Congress, Professor Sharif did well to make clear to his brother savants, meeting in, to quote his words, " the land made sacred and holy in the past by the birth of Saṃkara, " the distinguished contribution of Islamic culture to world thought. From mutual understanding springs mutual appreciation ; from mutual appreciation, mutual respect ; from mutual respect, mutual regard ; from mutual regard, true unity.—ED.]

In the early part of the seventh century, A. D., a new spring of thought burst forth in the deserts of Arabia and soon swelled into a sea seething with life. It was Islam. We are not just now concerned with the life of the Mussalmans in their days of glory. For our present purpose what we want to study, and that too very briefly, is their contribution to the development of thought.

The remarkable impetus that the spirit of Islam gave to knowledge came direct from the *Quran* and the sayings of the Prophet of Islam. The *Quran* teaches man to reflect on the phenomena of nature and the laws they imply. It bids him ponder over the mysteries of death and birth, growth and decay, of men and nations, and to contemplate the beauties of the soul more than those of sense.

Coming to the sayings of the Prophet, " Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave " and " To listen to the words of the learned and to instil into others the lessons of science is better than religious exercises. " No wonder that the Mussalmans drank deep at all the fountains of knowledge which they reached in their forward march to progress !

The first of these fountains was Syria. Before the advent of Islam, Hellenistic philosophy had passed from Greece to Alexandria and from there it had spread to Syriac centres of learning, Antioch, Nisibis and Chalcis.

Then, in the middle of the sixth century A. D., Mar Ahba, a convert from Zoroastrianism, established a school at Seleucia like the Nestorian (heretical Christian) school at Nisibis and a little later the Persian King, Nawsherwan, who had offered a home to the ejected Greek philosophers when the Byzantine emperor, Justinian, closed the schools at

Athens, founded a Zoroastrian school at Jundi Shapur. Here not only Greek and Syriac works, but also Indian writings on philosophy and science, were translated into Pehlavi, and both Indian and Greek systems of medicine were taught and developed.

Besides these, there was a school at Harran, established since the time of Alexander the Great, where Greek Paganism and Neoplatonism as formulated by Porphyry continued to live a rather secluded but intellectually vigorous life.

These several schools did not produce many philosophers or scientists of outstanding merit or books of lasting value. But they kept alive an intellectual tradition which offered a rich soil for the production of outstanding men. And when the seed was supplied by the spirit of Islam, such men were produced not by the dozen, but by the hundred.

The rise of Muslim thought began with a period which, though rich in original thought, was chiefly marked by translations from Sanskrit, Persian, Syriac and Greek. So extensive was the range of Arabic translation of philosophical and scientific classics that within eighty years of the establishment of Baghdad the Arabs were in possession of the greater part of the works of Aristotle, including the spurious Mineralogy, Mechanics and Theology, which last was actually an abridged paraphrase of the last three books of Plotinus's *Enneads*, some of the works of Plato and the Neoplatonists, the important works of Hippocrates, Galen, Euclid, Ptolemy and subsequent writers and commentators and several Persian and Indian writings. All this was taking place in the Muslim world when Greek thought was almost unknown in the West. Says Hitti :—

> While in the East al-Rashid and al-Māmūn were delving into Greek and Persian Philosophy, their contemporaries in the West, Charlemagne and his lords, were dabbling in the art of writing their names.

Education spread in the Muslim world with electric speed. The Muslims received from Alexandria, Syria and Persia an old tradition, but passed on to Europe an entirely new tradition, not only old but also new sciences, new studies and a vast store of knowledge.

It is but natural that geographical proximity should lead the flow of water from a higher place to a lower one. This analogy holds good in the case of thought. India was on the same intellectual plane and in certain respects on a higher plane than the Islamic countries in the eighth and ninth centuries and therefore streamlets naturally ran out or distributories were dug out to take modes of thought from India to the world of Islam. But the West, being geographically nearer the Islamic countries than India and being in the Middle Ages on a very much lower spiritual plane, was simply flooded by Muslim philosophy and science.

The Muslims learnt mathematics from the Hindus, philosophy from

the Greeks, astronomy and mathematics from both, and after making remarkable developments passed them on to Europe. They had among them the greatest encyclopædic writers of history and geography and were the founders of sociology and pioneers in the natural sciences.

Although the Muslims did not originate philosophical thought as they originated scientific enquiry, some of their achievements in this field were most remarkable. They were acquainted with Hindu philosophy, were masters of Greek thought, and their speculation was deep and extensive. They paved the way for further speculation and opened the door for the European Renaissance. This indeed is their chief claim to fame in philosophy. From the point of view of their attitude towards reason and revelation, Muslim philosophers can be classified into three main groups: (1) The scholastics, (2) the mystics and (3) the rationalists. The scholastics again fall into two groups: (a) The rationalist scholastics and (b) the orthodox scholastics.

Muslim philosophical thought began with the rationalist scholastics or Mutazilites. Broadly speaking, their position is: Both revelation and reason are the sources and criteria of knowledge and therefore they must be in perfect harmony. If there is any inconsistency between them, revelation must be tested by logic. The universe is not eternal. It had a beginning in time. God is one. He is eternal. He is not anthropomorphic. Man has free-will and is responsible.

The orthodox scholastics called the Ash'arites held revelation, intuition or inspiration to be the only source of knowledge; reason has to submit to its pronouncements. The fleeting nature of things shows that they consist of atomic substances, monads. All change is due to their coming into existence and dropping out again. In themselves they are changeless. All causality lies in the Divine will. Existence is not a quality of things, but is the very essence of reality and God alone exists. The rest are all phenomena. From Him both good and evil proceed and no law can limit His action. Man, according to this school, is determined and all his actions flow from the Divine will.

The chief thinkers of the school were al-Ash'ari, Abū Bakr Bāquilāni, Imāmul Haramain, Shahrastāni, al-Rāzi and al-Ghazzāli. The last-named—though not the greatest, certainly the most original of all Muslim thinkers—is a link between the orthodox scholastics and the mystics. He was the head of the Nizāmiyya College of Baghdad near the end of the eleventh century.

Al-Ghazzāli's thought anticipated the main features of the entire philosophy of the West from Descartes to Bergson. It is difficult to believe that Descartes did not know al-Ghazzāli's general position and was not influenced by it through the Latin Scholastics, whom beyond

question he must have read. Exactly like Descartes, he begins with describing how in vain he interrogated in his mind every sect for an answer to the problems that disturbed him and how he finally resolved to discard all authority. Exactly like Descartes, he comes to his conclusions by a study of his own self. Only Descartes' starting formula is "I think, therefore, I am," while his formula is, "I will, therefore, I am." Both Descartes and Spinoza follow almost verbatim al-Ghazzāli's derivation of the negative and positive attributes of God from the concept of necessary existence. Again the distinction made by Descartes, Spinoza and Galileo between the infinite (that, the part of which cannot be expressed by any number or measurement) and the indefinite (that which has no limit) is exactly the same as that made by al-Ghazzāli and Avicenna. Spinoza's idea of substance is the same as al-Ghazzāli's idea of God. Like Kant he distinguishes between phenomena and noumena. He anticipates Schopenhauer and the other voluntarists in holding that not thought but will is the fundamental reality, and Bergson in making intuition the source of knowledge. It was the Protestant revolt that freed the West from the grip of this great man's intellect, and in the East, having conquered all rival thought, it has even to this day a hold too tight to allow any fresh movement.

The third school of Muslim thought is that of the mystics. They fall into two groups : (a) The theistic and (b) the pantheistic mystics. In the earliest Muslim mystics the influence of Neoplatonism, Neopythagorianism and Christian Gnosticism is marked. Many pantheists were definitely under the influence of Vedantic and Buddhistic thought, though the greatest of them all, Ibn 'Arabi, shows no trace of it. The Muslim mystics agreed with the Ash'arites that inspiration was the only source of knowledge, but they laid great stress on inner purity. Al-Ghazzāli is said to be a link between the orthodox scholastics and the mystics because he also held the same view. Like mystics all over the world they believed that inner purity can be achieved only by the love and contemplation of God and renunciation of everything else, and that without a pure heart even good deeds have no value. Rūmi was the greatest poet-philosopher of Islam. Professor Nicholson has translated his great poem, the *Masnavi*, into English and Professor Hakim has written a monograph on it. Iqbal regarded him as his spiritual leader.

European mysticism was very much influenced by the mysticism of Islam. The Spanish Orientalist Miguel Asin y Palacios writes in his *Islam and the Divine Comedy* that Dante owed many details of his picture of the next world in *The Divine Comedy* to Ibn 'Arabi. Arthur J. Arberry observes in *The History of Sufism* that

it is impossible, for example, to read the poems of the Spanish mystic St.

John of the Cross without concluding that his entire process of thinking and imaginative apparatus owed much to those Muslim mystics who had also been natives of Spain.

In the beginning of the fourteenth century Raymond Hull wrote on mysticism. He was an accomplished Arabic scholar and the founder of a school of Oriental languages at Rome. His mystical writings are "beyond question" influenced by Sufi speculation. These are only a few examples of what Arberry regards as "unquestionably a general process." In later times the influence of Persian mystical poetry on so great a genius as Goethe is too well-known to be mentioned.

Now let us come to the last school of Muslim thought—the Rationalists, of whom it can be truly said that they "raised up the wisdom and knowledge of Hellas from the dead" and passed them on to the West as to the East. The most renowned among them were al-Kindi (d. 873 A. D.), Fārābi (d. 950 A. D.), Ibn Sīna (L. Avicenna, d. 1037 A. D.), Ibn Bājja (L. Avenpace, d. 1138 A. D.), Ibn Ṭufail (L. Abubacer, d. 1185 A. D.) and Ibn Rushd (L. Averroes, d. 1198 A. D.). Most of them, like most of the leading scholastics, wrote books on several subjects besides philosophy.

Roughly speaking, the school moved from a synthesis of Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism and Islam to Aristotelianism pure and simple. Al-Kindi, Fārābi and Avicenna attempted to produce a Muslim-Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy; only Fārābi was more Aristotelian and Avicenna more Neoplatonic. The later thinkers of the school gave up the attempt at synthesis as hopeless and became avowed peripatetics and managed to keep theology and philosophy apart.

Roger Bacon and Cardanus held al-Kindi in high esteem, the latter for his assertion of the unity and universality of the world on account of which the complete knowledge of a part contained the knowledge of the whole, the fundamental principle of the English absolutists of today.

Al-Fārābi is said to be the greatest Muslim philosopher, and his importance cannot be overestimated. He was universally regarded in the history of Muslim thought as the "second teacher," the first being Aristotle. All later thinkers acknowledge their indebtedness to him. On Avicenna and Averroes his influence is apparent.

Most of Avicenna's works were translated into Hebrew and Latin before the close of the twelfth century. With his treatise *Oriental Philosophy*, now lost, Roger Bacon was well acquainted. In Al-Fārābi and Avicenna a mystic strain was also prominent.

The purest and the greatest of all the peripatetics was Averroes. Among his theories which opened the door to the European Renaissance, that of two truths, in the words of Macdonald, "ran like wildfire through the schools of Europe." Averroes held that religion and

philosophy differed, if not in their content, at least in the expression of the common truth. Therefore it was best to keep them apart as two truths, and accept the position that something may be true theologically but not philosophically and *vice versa*. Thus the realm of Grace was separated from the realm of Nature, the one for the theologian to pursue and the other for the scientist and the philosopher to know. The theory of two truths, combined with the doctrine that matter is eternal and potent to produce all forms from within itself, was a Godsend for the scientifically-minded people of the West who were persecuted by the Orthodox Church and the State. They found in "Averroism" their best support. For over four centuries this remarkable man held sway over the intellect of Europe and laid the foundations of the Italian Renaissance. Coulton compares his influence with that of Darwin in our time; but for a true comparison, Darwinism has yet to live for three more centuries.

The conditions that led to the decline of Muslim thought were many; but perhaps the chief of them were the extreme philosophies of al-Ghazzāli and Averroes—the extreme intuitionism of the one and the extreme rationalism of the other. Under the influence of the former, Muslim thought was lost in the clouds of Mysticism; under the influence of the latter Western thought ran into the abyss of materialism. For true knowledge both intuition and reason are needed. Intuition cannot ignore the laws of logic. And reason has to depend for its knowledge of the basic and the ultimate on intuition. It was a mistake of Muslim philosophy to depend wholly on the one or the other or to keep them apart. Reason and intuition must supplement each other. The upward movement of Muslim thought will depend mostly on the recognition of this truth.

M. M. SHARIF

To flee vice is the beginning, and the beginning of wisdom is to get rid of folly.

—HORACE

SOME INDIAN NOVELISTS WRITING IN ENGLISH

[The English critic **Mr. Philip Henderson,** author of *The Novel of Today* and other works, limits this interesting survey to those Indian writers of novels and stories in the last decade who are perhaps best known to English readers. There are other Indians, as Indian readers know, who use the English medium as sensitively and as revealingly in novels and short stories. Shri Masti Venkatesa Iyengar's short stories, and especially his moving novelette *Subbanna,* all translated by himself from Kannada writings; "Shankar Ram's" (Shri T. L. Natesan's) novel and his short stories with their artistic restraint ("The Madman's Hobby" is a masterpiece, unique in its blend of horror and pathos); Shri K. S. Venkataramani's works and those of several more richly deserve a wider reading public. They all can help the English mind to read the Indian heart and so help on the unity of East and West that all now recognise as so desirable.—ED.]

It is time that some attempt was made to assess the ever-increasing contribution of Indian writers to English literature. In this article I am concerned only with the novelists and short-story writers, and even so in the space allotted I can give no more than a brief introduction to the work of some of the most recent writers.

It can be said that Indian writers have introduced an entirely new accent into English literature, an accent as remarkable for its lightness and its gaiety as for its tenderness; a lyricism and mobility of mood that is not to be found in the work of English writers since the medieval and Elizabethan eras. At its best it gives something of the same delight as the discovery of Chinese poetry in England about twenty years ago through the translations of Arthur Waley.

The Indian genius, however, is less restrained and classical than the Chinese, and their novelists give us an experience that is nearer, in kind if not in degree, to that which we derive from some of the great Russian novelists of the nineteenth century. For the modern Indian writer finds himself in a situation in many ways comparable to the novelists' of Tzarist Russia, though in his case there is the inherited tradition of an ancient and exquisite civilization, a great philosophy and religion, and schools of sculpture, painting, music and dancing whose power, subtlety and grace have seldom, if ever, been rightly appreciated in Europe. In the work of the Indian novelist writing in English, then, we may see a new fusion of the cultures of East and West. Anglo-Indian literature is still a young literature, with many of the *gaucheries* of youth, but

also with the infinite possibilities of youth, though its roots are so old. It is only through their writers that different nations can really understand one another, for creative art cuts right across the artificial barriers constructed between peoples by their respective governments and an irresponsible press.

The Indian writers who have made the most notable contributions to the English novel in the last ten years or so are Raja Rao, R. K. Narayan, Ahmed Ali and Mulk Raj Anand. Many other writers have also published short stories in English journals, notably Alagu Subramaniam, Iqbal Singh, Sarat Chandra Chatterji (an important Bengali novelist), J. Vijaya-Tunga (a talented Cingalese writer) and Sajjad Zaheer, a Hindustani novelist whose *One Night in London* was published by the Indian Progressive Writers' Association. The work of several of these writers has also appeared in the folios of *Indian Writing*, a bi-monthly journal published in London and edited by Iqbal Singh, Ahmed Ali, K. S. Shelvankar and Subramaniam. Singh's early story *When One Is in It* (Indian Progressive Writers' Association) should be mentioned separately, for it is a work of considerable artistry and powerful feeling. Subramaniam is a charming and talented writer whose work is distinctive for that sensitive combination of tenderness and wit peculiar to the Indian genius.

What is significant about the books of the majority of these young men is that they deal for the most part not at all with the picturesque and colourful India of mystery, pageantry and princes' courts so dear to the European imagination; their mainspring is a sense of pity for and communion with the sufferings of their country's innumerable poor. The background of their books is sometimes modern industrial life, sometimes the immemorial life of village and field, sometimes the life of the professional middle-class and the intelligentsia of the cities. Singh's story, for instance, which shows the undigested influence of Aldous Huxley and suffers from certain affectations of style, is nevertheless a searching and sympathetic study of a poor girl who comes to find a job in a silk factory. Her lot is bitterly contrasted with the cynical attitude of the young managing director, who emerges from the factory gates in his limousine among the crowd of peasants who have been waiting for hours at the factory in the hope of jobs. Raja Rao's *Kanthapura*, which is probably the most considerable single contribution yet made by any Indian novelist to Anglo-Indian literature, has for its central theme the Gandhi movement. This theme is interwoven with the centuries-old life of the village Kanthapura with its legends, traditions and local characters. Rao's novel is constructed with impeccable art and a subtle sensitiveness to English words and the natural rhythms of Indian speech, and he has used the manner of the traditional

Indian story-teller. The result is a genuine Indian novel. In a foreword he states the problem that faces every Indian writer using English :—

The telling has not been easy. One has to convey in a language that is not one's own the spirit that is one's own. One has to convey the various shades and omissions of a certain thought-movement that looks maltreated in an alien language. I use the word "alien," yet English is not really an alien language to us. It is the language of our intellectual make-up—like Sanskrit or Persian was before—but not of our emotional make-up. We are all instinctively bilingual, many of us writing in our own language and in English. We cannot write like the English. We should not. We cannot write only as Indians. We have grown to look at the large world as part of us. Our method of expression, therefore, has to be a dialect which will some day prove to be as distinctive and colourful as the Irish or the American. Time alone will justify it. After the language the next problem is that of style. The tempo of Indian life must be infused into our English expression, even as the tempo of American or Irish life has gone into the making of theirs. We, in India, think quickly, we talk quickly, and when we move we move quickly. There must be something in the sun of India that makes us rush and tumble and run on....We have neither punctuation nor the treacherous "at's" and "on's" to bother us—we tell an interminable tale. Episode follows episode, and when our thoughts stop our breath stops, and we move on to another thought. This was and still is the ordinary style of our story-telling. I have tried to follow it myself in this story.

This foreword of Rao's will explain much in the Indian novel that may at first seem strange to a European reader, though, as I have already remarked, the same method has been used before in the Russian novel, and we see it in its most extreme form in the work of Mulk Raj Anand. The opening sentences of *Kanthapura* will give some indication of its poetic method and cadences :—

Our village—I don't think you have ever heard about it—Kanthapura is its name, and it is in the province of Kārā.

High on the Ghats is it, high up the steep mountains that face the cool Arabian seas, up the Malabar coast is it, up Mangalore and Puttur and many a centre of cardamom and coffee, rice and sugar-cane. Roads, narrow, dusty, rut-covered roads, wind through the forests of teak and of jack, of sandal and of sal, and hanging over the bellowing gorges and leaping over elephant-haunted valleys, they turn now to the left and now to the right and bring you through the Alambe and Champa and Mena and Kola passes into the great granaries of trade. There, on the blue waters, they say, our carted cardamoms and coffee get into the ships the Red-men bring, and, so they say, they go across the seven oceans into the countries where our rulers live.

R. K. Narayan, in his novels and short stories, *e. g.*, *The Dark Room*, *Bachelor of Arts* and "The English Teacher," writes for the most part about the smaller professional

middle-class with a gentle irony and a haunting sadness that has gained him the reputation of the Indian Chekhov. His characters are people oppressed with much the same sense of futility generated by the dead weight of a bureaucratic state machine within which there is no scope for their talents. But his writing is without political bitterness or tendentiousness, which makes the picture he gives all the more moving and permanent.

By far the most prolific contemporary Indian novelist writing in English is Mulk Raj Anand. The very bulk of his work has gained for him in England the reputation of India's foremost interpreter, a title which, I believe, is not generally assented to in India. Anand is a hasty and careless writer and displays none of the subtle art of Raja Rao or Narayan. He writes as a Communist and his novels are often constructed in cycles (for instance, the series dealing with the impact of the First World War on peasant life, *The Village, Across the Black Waters* and *The Sword and the Sickle*) and are deliberately designed to throw the sufferings of the Indian peasant into the most lurid relief. Anand writes with great gusto and exuberance and his work is further enlivened by a delightful, not to say farcical, sense of humour, carrying the reader along in its rapid and high-pitched torrent of words. Certainly, though he lives in England, there must be something in the sun of India that makes him "rush and tumble and run on" so.

His originality consists not only in his material but in his approach, seeing everything through the eyes of simple naïve people, which produces an effect that is sometimes most moving and touching. For he shows these simple people, with all their old inherited customs and habits of thought generated by an ancient religion and a feudal way of life, brought face-to-face with the bewildering complexity of modern "civilization," suddenly transplanted from their village homes into the maelstrom of an industrial revolution. Anand's writing quivers with an outraged social conscience, a tenderness and pity that is something new in the modern sociological novel. His first novel, *Untouchable*, introduced us to the world of outcasts. *Coolie*, which followed, is a study of a village lad who goes to work first as a servant in a middle-class household (pictured with every circumstance of farce), then in "a medieval pickle factory," and finally in a Bombay cotton mill. The family scenes in this book are all very well done and there is a moving account of that humanity and comradeship in distress which alone makes the lot of the very poor at all bearable. *Two Leaves and a Bud*, a somewhat exaggerated and lurid account of a tea plantation, is less successful, especially in the case of the English characters who, to an Englishman at any rate, are quite incredible. My objection to those characters is not that they are

unpleasant (they are unpleasant enough in E. M. Forster's classic *A Passage to India*) : it is that they are simply bad caricatures and as such are a serious blot on Anand's novels.

Altogether, the curious thing about Anand's novels is that, though they set out to give a true picture of India, they are not realistic in any true sense at all ; though originally founded on facts, the picture drawn is always subjective and queered by the author's fantasy. This comes out most clearly in his descriptions of scenery and places, which have obviously never been accurately observed, so that the total impression is often muddled and blurred. Anand is seen at his best in such short stories as the delightful " Barbers' Trade Union, " where the limitations of the form impose their own discipline. In sheer bulk, however, his contribution to the Anglo-Indian novel is a remarkable achievement.

There could hardly be a greater contrast to the work of Anand, with its political enthusiasm and careless ebullience, than Ahmed Ali's novel *Twilight in Delhi*, a nostalgic picture of the dead glories of the old Mahommedan city. Ali, who is also a fine novelist and poet in Urdu, has a sensitive and poetic talent and there are exquisite moments in his novel. More " progressive " writers might regard his work as reactionary with its lingering regret over the passing of old customs and ceremonies. But as a memorial to a great civilisation it has much beauty and evocative power. The central character of *Twilight in Delhi* is a young poet who is nevertheless a rebel against the traditions of his forefathers. Especially memorable are the scenes of family life, the marriage ceremony, Asghar's courtship of the exquisite Bilqeece, and the father (a wonderfully observed character) watching his pigeons flying against the fading sunset over the roofs of Delhi. Into such scenes Ahmed Ali has distilled the essence of a whole civilization.

PHILIP HENDERSON

HUMANITY FIRST

[**Leslie Belton's** article starts with an assumption that is not accurate, though it is widely accepted. That assumption is that man is born in and of savagery. Anthropology and archæology are not correctly co-ordinated and so the ancient view is not given the serious consideration it deserves. That view regards men as children of Light nurtured and nourished by Divine Instructors in the infancy of self-conscious humanity. The early races of men were taught the science of agriculture and the art of kindling fire, architecture, astronomy and hygiene, and many more things. Savagery resulted from the process of involution in gross matter, the birth of egotism, which brought decline in morals, then in knowledge, then in standards of living. The fascinating story is to be found in Volume II of H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*. When we learn to look upon our roots as divine and not barbaric, when we place savagery as a by-product of degenerating human groups, we shall be better able to educate our young, for we shall learn to look upon them not as evolving animals but as unfolding gods. Barring this view, implicit in the early paragraphs of the article, Mr. Belton puts forward ideas which inspire because they are true. The concluding sentence carries a very practical message waiting to be utilised.—Ed.]

A reading of human history allows of the generalisation that men have always sought to increase their resistance to the forces of nature. In order to exist, early man had to trap his food, find shelter against the elements and clothe himself to withstand cold. To achieve this and thus to maintain his existence he invented tools. Man's subsequent history is largely the story of the strengthening and multiplying of his hands through the refining of his tools, from the first rude flints to the utilisation of the energy in coal and oil and finally in the atomic structure. Slowly through the centuries man's power over nature has increased until at last it seems that his mastery is almost limitless. There lies the problem.

Man's every discovery or invention has been used, directly or indirectly, to increase both the happiness and the misery of society, for constructive and for destructive purposes alike. Every additional power that has come to man has served to lighten his labour and ease the burden of life ; but also, and with devastating results in recent years, it has been used in the waging of war. The wheel, the use of metals, machinery, fuels, printing, tele-communication, aircraft, have all strengthened man's arm in peace and in war alike.

The implication is clear : if this continue, man's empire on earth will end catastrophically. Men and women the world over have now to accept the enormous task of break-

ing a habit that is ingrained in human nature through the custom of untold centuries, the habit of using power for personal, tribal, religious or national ends regardless of consequences. So portentous is the power that man can now employ that a radical change is not merely desirable but imperative if humanity is to save itself from a catastrophe more shattering than any the world has known. The significance lies in the fact that for the first time in human history the preservation of man's heritage of civilisation depends upon the exertion of his own moral will. No less than a moral mutation is called for, a moral heave that will lift him, though it be painfully, into a new way of life.

Is this moral assertion possible, is it beyond man's attainment as yet? That is the crucial question, and no prophet can answer it with confidence. We can but read the signs and attempt to point the way.

The greater man's control over nature, the greater is the need for control of *human* nature, the more urgent the need for moral refinement. As Mr. Winant has said, "We must learn one more secret—a moral secret this time. We must learn how to live together in friendship." One of the happier signs of the times is that people respond applaudingly, if a trifle sceptically, to sentiments like these; they recognise the moral choice when it is presented to them, for the masses have good-will in their hearts if not always in their heads.

We must learn to live together as friends. The sentiment is unimpeachable though it may be doubted whether the repetition of moral truisms will take us very far. Millions of us know how we *ought* to live and have a fair notion of those moral principles which should underlie human relationships; but can we ensure their being widely honoured and strictly applied in a world where nine-tenths of human behaviour has no regard to rational or moral suasion? Concentrating on essentials, there seem two ways of replying to the question, two inter-related lines of approach. The keywords are Law and Religion.

A community of saints and sages would need no law, for the existence of a codified law is evidence of man's failure to keep the inward law which only the noblest of men faithfully obey. Saints and sages are few and "weaker brethren" many. For the ordering of society we have need of codes of law, and one of the tests we fitly apply in judging a nation's enlightment is the "purity" of its laws; that nation is civilised, we say, which administers justice wisely and impartially with equal regard to all its citizens, high and low. Justice is itself an expression of communal morality, the art of living together in friendship.

Can we then achieve for the world as a whole what nations have achieved with varying success within their own borders? The question is of vital consequence; hence the considerable interest in international law

and the growing realisation among the people of many countries that institutions which ensure law and order *within* nations should become the means, suitably adapted, for ensuring law and order *between* the nations.

International law exists already in an embryonic form and even the second world war has left some shreds of it. States enter into relations with one another, negotiate treaties, adjust conflicting claims and generally observe a body of rules and conventions which have come into being to regulate their behaviour. That these rules are often flouted is all too true but in no way proves that the rules have no validity, any more than unlawful conduct of individuals within a State proves the invalidity of municipal law.

International law needs modernising and amplifying. Above all, it should involve fuller recognition of the principle that no nation-state, however powerful, should be the sole judge in disputes concerning its own interests, a principle which unfortunately the World Security Council fails to recognise. The idea of sovereignty, a survival from the days when kings treated with kings, may continue to bedevil international relations for many a day. The conference at San Francisco achieved no more in this direction than to lay down that the General Assembly should

initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international co-operation in the political field and encourage the progressive development of international law and its codification.

If an observing layman may express an opinion, the need for codification is paramount for, in default of it, the preservation of peace and order may depend all too riskily upon *ad hoc* arrangements among the Powers themselves rather than upon the recognition of a basis in law comprehending all nations with obligations to fulfil as well as rights to defend.

Law is an instrument, not an end in itself. Whether it can be made to work in the field of international relationships, serving the ends of justice, depends upon the will to make it work ; and the will is fortified by something other than codes and rules, something not easily definable —an inspiration, a way of life, a religion. If international law is to operate successfully there must be a large measure of moral understanding among the peoples who accept the law and the statesmen who administer it. If, further, there is to be moral understanding—not among the few only but wide-spread throughout the world—there is need of that vital impulse which only a spiritual world view, a living religion, can give.

Human experience suggests that an ethic can be preserved only if it is associated with some undergirding religious philosophy of life, some conviction that sustains and sanctions it, some ultimate reference

beyond the flux of temporal interests and events. How the ultimate is conceived and described is important, but more important than concepts and descriptions is the underlying purpose of all high religion—to unify, to bind men and women as members one of another in loyalty to a Supreme Ideal, however variously this ideal be imaged or named. To this end each religion has its contribution to make, and the nobler its vision, the less exclusive its claims and the more embracing its fellowship, the greater will be its uplifting aid as a unifying influence in a fragmented world.

There exists nowhere in the world a single organisation alone capable of achieving this end. Neither Communism nor Christianity, nor any other philosophy or religion, is of itself capable of unifying men's endeavours, for the day is past when large areas of the world could be held together under the sway of an authoritarian Church wielding temporal power. The sense of unity must be born in men's minds, and every philosophy or religion which assists its appearing is aiding the achievement of that recognition of spiritual unity which alone can give us a united and law-abiding world.

The way of advance, then, is not through the triumph over all others of any one organised faith, or through the advent of some new evangel, but through the increasing realisation of the essential purpose of religion, whether the purpose be recognised or obscured, in the minds of men and women everywhere. A man can start where he is, not renouncing his birthright faith but enlarging his comprehension of it, and hence of the "religion" that lies within all the religions. What he will discard are the irrelevancies, the credal matter-of-factness that literalises the mystery and poetry of spiritual truth. He will achieve a deeper understanding of Oneness, the source of a practical world ethic, and already of that striving for social justice which is one of the outstanding marks of our time.

An important implication is this: conduct is not truly ethical if its concern for some sectional interest—the good of a country, a class, a party, a religion—cause harm to the world community. Every law and every moral code is subordinate to this for this is the end they serve. The final reference is Humanity.

Come what may, then, of tumult and distress, or new alarming discoveries in the outer world, there are discoveries to be made in the inner world also, undreamed-of adventures in the Country of the Mind. What the greatest of spiritual teachers have known, we also can know if we follow their way.

LESLIE BELTON

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

HEAVEN AND HELL *

Mr. C. S. Lewis is a master of modern parable; *The Screwtape Letters* established him as that. And, like Plato whose disciple he surely is to some degree, he has a felicity of style that drives home the meaning of his tales like a bright sword. He has a rare skill, too, in the pungent epigram. "You cannot take all luggage with you on all journeys; on one journey even your right hand and your right eye may be among the things you have to leave behind." "It's not out of bad mice or bad fleas you make demons, but out of bad archangels." "There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, "Thy will be done," and those to whom God says, in the end, "*Thy* will be done." Whether we agree or disagree with Mr. Lewis's views, we are not likely to forget ideas expressed in such shape.

His new book is a parable of Heaven and Hell. There was a time when these conceptions were by no means parabolic. In antiquity, in the Middle Ages, for naïve thought everywhere in pre-Copernican days, Hell was a fiery pit beneath the crust of the earth and Heaven a golden palace on the roof of the clouds. Even today Roman Catholic theology is loath to forgo the notion of a *poena sensus*, a physical torment besides the *poena damni*, the realization of loss, for those condemned to Eternal Punishment. On the whole, however, Heaven and Hell have become for the modern theologian states of spiritual being rather than local abodes; and, once allegorizing has begun, the variations of interpretation may be infinite. A once famous Victorian novel, *The Sorrows of Satan*, represented the Devil as a victim rather than a villain, and in the Interlude to his *Man and Superman* Bernard Shaw introduced the view that Hell is not a prison for unwilling sufferers, but a place of cheap pleasures for souls too degraded to enjoy the spiritual bliss of Heaven. It is *there* that they would suffer if they had to partake of the life of the saints.

Mr. Lewis pursues the same line of imagination. From his Grey Town (Hell), which is much like a collection of the meaner streets of any of our great earthly cities, the way is always open to the shining uplands of Heaven—the buses are always running—but visitors to Heaven from below don't much like it when they get there. One reason why they don't (and it is difficult not to sympathize with them) is because to their frail, ghostly limbs the landscape of Heaven is of a torturing hardness—blades of grass, flowers, running streams, falling rain-drops are all to them like solid stone or metal. No wonder they cannot bear to explore a realm where walking cuts their feet and a shower is a hail of bullets! Dante never devised anything more barbaric in his Inferno, but this is Mr. Lewis's Paradiso!

He is a good deal more persuasive when he comes to analyse the spiritual

* *The Great Divorce: A Dream.* By C. S. Lewis. (Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

pains and impediments that make it so nearly impossible for any of the damned, helped as they are by the Spirits of the Blest, among them George Macdonald, the author of *Phantastes*, to remain in Heaven and submit to the purgation of becoming fit for its joys. But the note of hardness persists, and Mr. Lewis is not at all afraid to confess that his message is one of sharp cleavage. Rebuking Blake, who aspired to a "Marriage of Heaven and Hell," he declares for total Divorce between them.

> It is..."either-or!" If we insist on keeping Hell (or even earth) we shall not see Heaven: if we accept Heaven we shall not be able to retain even the smallest and most intimate souvenirs of Hell.

Shakespeare evidently would have much ado to convince Mr. Lewis that "There is some soul of goodness in things evil." He is for absolute discontinuity, a radical pluralist. Life, he holds, "does not move towards unity but away from it and the creatures grow further apart as they increase in perfection."

This is obviously a challenge to characteristic trends of modern thought, a challenge which loses nothing of its acrimony from Mr. Lewis's warning (on pages 37 to 39) to adherents of liberal theology to take care that their beliefs are not dishonest. (Do they need such a caution more than those who adhere to traditional orthodoxy for crooked mental motives?) What reply to make to that challenge the present reviewer feels in some doubt because he is not quite sure of the ultimate meaning of this brilliant, pathetic and witty piece of imaginative philosophizing. Does it sum up to a simple plea for integrity of Ideals, such as Plato might have put forward, desiring mankind not to degrade the Values of the Spirit by tainting them with the baser desires of the worldly life, while admitting at the same time that it is within the world of ordinary affection and striving that they are made manifest? Does his earnest appeal to lovers, whether husbands and wives, or parents and children, to remember that "There is but one good; that is God," mean that they should seek the Divine in and through the human Love, and only love in men and women that which is ideal in them? Or does it set up a transcendent Object of Love and Worship above and apart from the human spirits in which the godhead is revealed to our eyes? Mr. Lewis's attitude seems at times to be that of one "willing to wound and yet afraid to strike" the human affections and aspirations. Yet this may be unjust, since the bearing of his concluding metaphysical considerations on the relation of Time to Eternity—which is the same problem in a different form—is not entirely clear, at any rate to this reader. As ally or opponent, however, believers in Divine Immanence must salute Mr. Lewis.

D. L. MURRAY

The Rôle of the Law in Peace. By SOHRAB D. VIMADALAL. (Thacker and Co., Ltd., Bombay. Re. 1/-)

A lawyer's reasoned arguments always command respect. When to these he adds charm of language, he becomes irresistible. Mr. Vimadalal's little book is delightful reading. It possesses the reasoned lucidity of the lawyer-politician who reads in current events the

shape of things to come.

It is reasoning *in excelsis*, but according to Western methods. The Oriental aspect and outlook are not in the book. The lawyer's mind, trained to a particular method, sees the enforcement of law as by sanctions only. Therefore, in his ideal world must be set up an authority functioning by means of sanctions which have the backing of brute, blatant, overpowering force. This is planning a new world but retaining the defective machinery of the old. Herein lies the great lacuna in modern thought. The base and the vile of yesterday must be eschewed lest it taint the hope of the morrow.

Ram Rajya of the ancient past is a model according to which our modern thinkers may well plan their world state. What is required is that the ruling authority be so elastic and so perfectly in tune with the peoples that it is sensitive to reactions and quick in adequate and warm response. Otherwise no laws, howsoever framed, no decrees, howsoever rigid, can produce in a grouping of nations that frictionless, effortless movement which must be our goal.

J. M. T.

Psychical Research: Where Do We Stand? Being the Eighth Frederic W. H. Myers Memorial Lecture, 1945. By MRS. W. H. SALTER. (The Society for Psychical Research, 31, Tavistock Square, London, W. C. 1. 1s.)

This address reflects the result of sixty-odd years' effort on the part of the S. P. R. to stretch the cloth to fit their pattern instead of cutting their coat according to the cloth. In his first Presidential Address, in the '80's, Henry Sidgwick expressed the hope that by their efforts scientific incredulity might be "buried alive under a heap of facts." Not scientific incredulity but the S. P. R. itself has suffered vivisepulture—under a mountain of "nuts uncracked." Mrs. Salter, referring to the physical phenomena of Spiritualism, makes a significant admission:—

> Unless some better method of attack can be found I am left with the doleful suspicion that when the Society comes to celebrate its centenary, we shall be found
>
> "Still nursing the unconquerable hope
> Still clutching the inviolable shade."

For the immediate future she recommends quantitative experiments on a considerable scale in Extra-Sensory Perception and "greater co-ordination of psychical research." We wish that we could hope she meant co-ordination of the findings of the S. P. R. with those of the older psycho-spiritual sciences of India. For these could offer them the clues they need to free them from their present squirrel-wheel.

It is not quite ingenuous to claim for the *Proceedings* of the S.P.R., as Mrs. Sidgwick is quoted as doing, that "the reader will very seldom find that a statement or judgment has been published which afterwards has had to be withdrawn." Read, rather, "has been withdrawn." For, even when a judgment so notoriously unfair as Richard Hodgson's on the deliberately produced phenomena of Mme. H. P. Blavatsky has been challenged, the Society has taken refuge behind the claim that contributions to their *Proceedings* represent investigators' independent views and are not officially endorsed by the Society. So how can it claim credit for the S.P.R. where even such is due? It cannot have it both ways!

E. M. HOUGH

Shaik Muhammad Ali Hazin: His Life, Times and Works. By SARFĀRAZ KHAN KHATAK. (Sh. Mohammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazaar, Lahore. Rs. 8/-)

This is a biography of a great man, Shaik Muhammad Ali Hazin, poet, scholar, mystic and saint. (The list of his works cited by the author, few of them unfortunately now extant, covers eighty pages!) He is also one of the few Muslim saints whose tombs are in the holy city of Benares. Shaik Muhammad Ali Hazin was born at Iṣfāhan on the 17th of January 1692 A. D. His father, Abi Talib, was a scholar who had a library of five thousand volumes, all copied by himself. Hazin was a precocious child; at six, he wrote poetry; his father, however, forbade him, in true Platonic fashion, to be a poet, but poetry came to Hazin as naturally as leaves do to a tree.

Hazin had a rare earnestness of mind to seek out and follow the Truth. So he studied the scriptures of other religions, besides his own. But it was not given to him to pursue his studies in peace. He lived in times like our own now, when a great part of the world was devastated by wars. In Iran then, as now, alas! there were foreign powers, Turks, Afghans and Russians. He left his helpless country for India in search of peace, which he could not find. There was the misrule of the Delhi Emperors, and then, the invasion of Nadir Shah.

Some of Hazin's satires are on court life at Delhi:—

Every impudent fellow who comes to India will be visited by some mean people, who will flatter him. He too likes to make friendship with these low people, who very much resemble him. He becomes a reckless and avaricious person, and wanders aimlessly all over the country. When he becomes a pleasure-loving eunuch, he introduces himself to a King's Court. His mind will be impressed by the sweet smell of the Court, and he remains there for a few days. Then, due to some lucky stars, he becomes a Nawab or a General.

His sturdy independence of mind refused to bow even to Kings, or to be beholden to them. When Muhammad Shah wanted to grant him some lakhs of rupees, Hazin said to him, "I have come to visit India, not to beg." He gave lavishly whatever he had, to the poor; if he set up a house, he said, it became an inn, and he, only a traveller. In his wit, he seems like Bernard Shaw. When someone asked him about the merits of a poetical composition which he had written, Hazin replied that it was "fit to be washed from cover to cover." The man understood Hazin and threw it into the river.

Besides poetry, Hazin wrote on many subjects: Medicine, Astronomy, Theology, Logic and Resurrection. Love was the theme of his poetry. In the tomb which he built for himself at Benares, he inscribed the verse, "I have been a pupil of love and know nothing else." (Hazin lived and died a celibate.)

Hazin's love of truth and his fearlessness made him many enemies. His disgust with court life and with the meanness of his rival poets, drove him from place to place in search of peace. He found it at last in "Banāras." This weary and solitary man found, there, the solitude he wanted and which he admired "in the solitude of the Brahmans." "I wouldn't quit Banāras; here there is a universal temple; every Brahman boy here is a Lachman or Ram," he wrote. Hazin was a Shiah by birth and by faith, but lived the life of a Sufi.

At the close of his long life of seventy-four years, there is a circumstance which testifies to the purity of his life. While performing his daily ablutions, one day his mantle got polluted. He cut it away with a pair of scissors, and told the people that, that day his days were numbered. Like the ancient Stoics, Hazin heard the call to quit his mortal body. Without any disease or ailment, and after settling his worldly and religious affairs, Shaik Muhammad Hazin covered himself with a mantle and gave up his bodily life like a Yogi, on Thursday, the 15th October 1766.

As is natural, the biography of such a man is a mixture of history and hearsay, of fact and legend. The author, with much industry and patience, has separated the two ; and, altogether, the work is a fine piece of literary and historical research.

Translations of the Persian passages into English, are, however, very desirable.

N. A. NIKAM

Indian Music : An Introduction. By D. P. MUKERJI. (Kutub Publishers, Poona 2. Rs. 5/-)

Indian music and the subtle beauty of its melodies have been so interestingly described in this slim volume by D. P. Mukerji that there are few publications on this subject which can compare with it.

The author's references to European music help to clarify certain details. As Renan has said, a nation and its culture are not matters solely of blood or language. "A nation is such because it wills to be such ; a great tradition, the memory of a civilization, and a heritage create this overwhelming will." No alien therefore can enter into the spirit of our music, unless he understands its background and colour. By tracing the sociological basis of Indian music in the earlier chapters, and by his descriptions of the many pretty peculiarities of the Indian *Rāgas*, Mr. Mukerji has created a fine background for the appreciation of this great art.

The author has rightly stressed the truth that in India listening to good music is as much an art as rendering it. As he says, "The listener's contribution has always been considered to be positive," for "pleasure is an exchange." Between the artist and those who assemble to hear him a nexus of spiritual fellowship is established at the very outset which is most fascinating.

Evidently, however, Mr. Mukerji is not much of a purist, as his remarks on Tagore's musical innovations seem to indicate. One wonders, despite what the author writes, and in spite of what Tagore himself thought of his own music, whether such innovations as modern Bengal offers to us are indeed of much cultural value. The critics of these innovations are against them, not because they are impatient of any new changes as such (as Mr. Mukerji seems to imply), but because they feel that these tunes in their arrogant disregard of *Tala* and certain laws of melody—which are after all the soul of Indian music—destroy rather than enhance the beauty of this great art. It is true that the creations of Mian Tansen and Abdul Fazal also had in them the blending of airs and the assimilation of foreign melodies, as Mr. Mukerji points out. But it is also true that not all blending and assimila-

tion have in them the same stamp of genius which give to such ventures a permanent value and greatness. According to many able savants, Tagore has not been able to add in any way to the stature of Indian music by his experiments. Anyway, the author has here raised a controversial issue which but serves to enliven the interest for his readers.

Certainly, Mr. Mukerji is to be congratulated, not only on the information that his book affords, but also on his language, which is both dignified and eloquent.

MANI SAHUKAR

The Mockery of Law. By DR. D. PANT, B. COM., PH. D. (Dublin). Kitab Mahal, Allahabad. Rs. 3/-)

This book reminds us of the old dictum "It is easy to destroy, but hard to construct." Mr. Pant, a keen observer of men and matters, has given a very satirical account of the Law and its application to various persons. He thinks that the weak and the poor pay homage to law, but the rich and the strong mock at it. The former pays for justice, the latter buys justice. With this main theme, he has written ten chapters on "Law Is an Ass," "Law Is Common Sense" etc., with one chapter for "Law for Women and Children and Colour." His criticisms are pungent.

That the legislature, being in supreme charge of making and unmaking laws, will never be guilty of breaking them, is the false assumption upon which the various Emergency Ordinances of the Governor-General are promulgated, in defiance of public opinion and common-sense. The author forgets that if such power were not held by the Governor-General, emergencies could not be dealt with at all.

His remark that sin is acquired, that it is the product of environment, requires deep thinking. This is an argument for socialisation, for the unholy partners in the creation of sin for the infant are parents, relations, friends and teachers, priests, society and the State. The Russian system of government might be the ideal of the author for he finds himself placed in a world of crimes and conventions; as he says, wrong laws wrongly interpreted swell the criminal ranks.

Society, he says, instead of permitting the reckless breeding of human beings, ought either to maintain the correlation between mouths on the one hand and food, service, space and goods on the other, or to apply the principle of the poultry-yard—commercial utilisation. It sounds hard when uttered, but many a reformer would prefer this to starvation in these days of food scantiness.

His support of the fifty-fifty rule for men and women in everything is timely and deserves serious thought.

On the whole, the book is very entertaining, though abounding in sarcasm.

M. A. JANAKI

Human Guinea-Pigs. By KENNETH MELLANBY. (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London. 4*s.* 6*d.*)

I have found the most interesting aspect of Major Mellanby's book, not so much his "description of the magnificent co-operation shown by conscientious objectors," on which the publisher insists, nor even his account of the effort which he initiated and directed to discover the cause of scabies (commonly called "the itch") and a cure for that painful ailment, which has been very much on the increase during the past ten years. The book is chiefly valuable, it seems to me, because the investigator, though he approves of vivisection, saw at the outset of his researches that he could not find out what he wanted by experiment on animals.

The itch is caused by a tiny creature which burrows under the skin. Various animals are afflicted in the same way, but Major Mellanby felt that, as their tormentors are not identical with that which is found in human beings, it was "preferable" to experiment on the latter. Many authorities would substitute "essential" for "preferable." For some time past there has been growing up disbelief in the possibility of learning from the reaction of animals to certain treatments anything definite about the effect of those treatments on men. The differences between the species are too great. Major Mellanby would no doubt deny this as a generalisation, but he acted upon it in this case.

He was assisted, voluntarily of course, by a number of conscientious objectors, whom he expected to find wild men, without humour, unreasonable and in every way difficult. He was agreeably surprised. Naïvely puzzled, too, when he saw that soldiers and conscientious objectors got on quite well together. The investigation was carried out, therefore, in favourable conditions; but it does not seem to have added to medical knowledge much more than was available before. A famous Austrian skin specialist "discovered almost all the main facts about scabies a hundred years ago" and a Danish doctor adopted just before the 1939 war a method of treatment which was then fifty years old and which "gave excellent results." If it had been generally used, the "suffering and discomfort caused by scabies would have been avoided." Instead many doctors employed "'remedies' which were worse than the disease."

That is disquieting. How is it that there can be such important omissions from the *materia medica* on which the medical profession ought to depend? Are there other methods of dealing with common complaints which are unknown, not only to general practitioners but even to men of the scientific attainments of Major Mellanby? He says it was "necessary to make a particular study of the subject" in order to know what had been done about scabies. Quite so, but is it no one's duty among all the men and women who practise medicine to make such studies and keep information of value before the world?

HAMILTON FYFE

Literature and Marxism. Edited by ANGEL FLORES. (India Publishers, Allahabad. Rs. 2/-)

The subtitle describes the book as "a controversy by Soviet critics." Six critics participate in the controversy, and there are ten contributions in all. Much heat and not a little fanaticism are brought into the argument, and with each fresh contribution the confusion is but worse confounded. Literature is a rendering of phenomenal life through the medium of language. Many things may be reflected in this rendering of life, and among them "class consciousness" and "class struggle." But to interpret every work of literature in terms of Dialectical Materialism is absurd in the extreme. There are more things in heaven and earth than are comprehended in economic values. Are spiritual and æsthetic values no more than chimeras of bourgeoisie concoction? It is easy to dismiss Priam as a doddering old absolutist, to see in Natasha Rostova "merely an expression of the feudal-landed view of woman," or to sort out the plebeian and patrician qualities in Shakespeare's make-up—but all this has little to do with literary criticism. Literature aims at a total compenetration of Reality, and the critic who would interpret it should bring to his task a like breadth of vision and depth of intuitive understanding. In the last contribution, Mr. Mark Rosenthal writes:—

> According to the theory of the class struggle, in analyzing a writer's work, the whole historical background and conditions in which the writer lived and worked must be fully considered; there must be a clear understanding of the basic and decisive social problems that were pressing for solution at the time; the relationship of all classes to those problems must be explored; and a concrete analysis must be made of the objective significance of the author's works and their objective relation to the basic problems of the class struggle.

Many a scientific researcher does fruitfully attempt all this, but it must be remembered that by merely enumerating various objective facts we do not explain away literature itself any more than we explain away the greatness of Shakespeare by enumerating the few prosy circumstances of his life that have come to light. It is, however, gratifying to note that Marxist and Leninist critics are giving up "vulgar sociology and metaphysics" and are now prepared to discover in literature something more than a dull mimicry of the class struggles of the past.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Everyman: A Morality Play. After the English translation from the Dutch (XVth century) together with the Renovation by Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1916). Translated and adapted by H. M. HYDE-MATZDORFF with the collaboration of A. ESTELLER, S.J. (Thacker and Co., Ltd., Bombay. Rs. 2/-)

Only the ardent Roman Catholic will find this "adaptation" an improvement upon the late fifteenth-century *Everyman,* supposed to be the English version of the Dutch *Elckerlijk,* the drama of a rich man whom Death summons to his last accounting. What the new version may have gained in dramatic interest by the introduction of the feast, Everyman's Mother, the Poor Neighbour, the Debtor and the Devil it has more than

lost in philosophical integrity.

The background of ecclesiastical belief and practice was there, of course, in *Everyman*, written before the Protestants arose, but all the stress was on good deeds and on morality. A subtle theological twist is given in the adaptation, which throws the stress on "Faith," significantly introduced in place of "Knowledge" in the earlier cast. The clergy's rôle is apotheosised; the Devil, come to fetch his own, is routed; repentance clears the sinner's slate. The moral obviously is, "Live as you please, and if you but repent with your last breath, all will be well." All the logic is on the Devil's side when he demands of Faith: "How can you absolve a lifelong sinner?" The subtitle of the new version is ill-chosen. This is rather an Immorality Play.

E. M. HOUGH

Twilight Bar. By ARTHUR KOESTLER. (Jonathan Cape, Ltd., London. 5*s*.)

Briefly summarised, this is the plot of Mr. Koestler's play: Visitors arrive from another planet and announce that the inhabitants of this one will be exterminated unless they become happy in three days. These visitors clearly represent great power, as the race to which they belong can turn stars purple and can change the climate of any planet at will. Mr. Koestler tells us the scene is An Island Republic; and calls his play an Escapade.

It is clear, therefore, that we are concerned with an imaginative myth—a marginal commentary on our own anarchic age. All we are entitled to ask is that the myth be integrally conceived, and that it accept its own imaginative challenge.

The action of *Twilight Bar* shows man's attempt to achieve happiness within the prescribed three-day limit. The first act shows the "reactionaries" in power—and the arrival of the mysterious visitors. Act Two, set in the Prime Minister's conference room, culminates in a government of "irresponsible extremists"—elected to inaugurate the Golden Age of Happiness. They have two days or forty-eight hours in which to implement this ideal.

Act Three shows their attempt to do this. Drinking, dancing, feasting, sex—all the familiar items on the Good Time programme—become obligatory. If there is satiric intent behind this failure to conceive happiness in any terms other than these, it is not apparent. The act ends at midnight. There are twenty-four hours to go.

In the fourth act, the reactionaries return to the helm—and the visitors are arrested. To one reader, the reason for the visitors' loss of power, revealed by their arrest, is obscure. Also, it is not plain whether their impotence is only temporary, as one of them asserts that the truth will be known before midnight—when the three-day limit ends.

It seems, therefore, that this play does not meet its own imaginative challenge. The essential situation (what will happen when the three-day reprieve ends) which informs the whole of the action, remains in mid-air when the final curtain falls. On balance, *Twilight Bar* seems yet another example of a writer's power to diagnose modern evils, and his inability to prescribe positive remedies. But this play will create many different responses—only one of which is indicated here. What is certain is that *Twilight Bar* has many amusing lines and much effective satire.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

We welcome the stand taken by Dr. K. N. Katju, Minister of Justice in the United Provinces, on capital punishment. *The National Herald* (Lucknow), which invites expressions of opinion on this subject, quotes him as saying at a recent press conference at Allahabad:—

> I feel that capital punishment serves no useful purpose. Taking away a man's life by the process of law is an exceedingly serious matter and I feel that, human justice being necessarily imperfect, it is impossible for law courts to take into consideration all relevant aspects as to the nature of punishment. I also feel that the death penalty in no way acts as a deterrent on the commission of murders. Had it been so, the crime of murder would have been checked long ago.

This charge-sheet by no means exhausts the arguments against this barbarous practice, whereby the State turns murderer. Crime is a moral malady and "the true physician cures the disease, and does not kill his patient." Cutting off the chance of reform, the proven possibilities of irremediable miscarriages of justice, the cruelty involved and the brutalising effect upon executioner and spectators, not to dwell upon the influence on others of the victim's thoughts and feelings, furnish additional points against this eye-for-an-eye anachronism.

Dr. Katju is right in holding that automatic remission of death sentences is not the solution. The savage sections need to be expunged from statute-books all over India, as they have been already in some Indian States, *e. g.*, in Cochin; and in Travancore, except for treason. Abroad, in recent years, New Zealand and war-ringed Switzerland abolished the death penalty for murder. It is worth noting that statistics do not justify the fear of crime increase where capital punishment is abolished. Swiftness and inevitability of punishment are far more effective as deterrents.

John Middleton Murry puts his finger on the weak spot of British Socialism in *The Adelphi* (April-June 1946) where he champions the underpaid, ill-organised farm labourer's cause. British Socialism demands justice for workers as against employers, but not, he charges, as between workers themselves. And nothing short of total justice is really worthy of the name of Socialism. The wage differentials created under capitalism are perpetuated under the Labour Government, apparently lest, if farm wages were increased, powerful organised groups should press for increases, to keep the fundamentally inequitable gap between their wages and those of agricultural labour. Farm workers, Mr. Murry claims, are penalised for their greater loyalty, as a class, to the job.

Socialism came to favour largely on the slogan "More wages for less work." Quite naturally, therefore, wage increases have been claimed and less work has been turned out, *e. g.*, by miners and building operatives. Yet democratic socialism can succeed only if men are "prepared to work as hard and as honestly of their own free motion for

the common weal as they did for private gain." Reducing output and malingering, under Socialism only more obviously than under other systems, are cheating oneself. Mr. Murry warns that if Socialism

> fails to waken in the citizens the new and unfamiliar sense that they are themselves the State, the vast machine of the State which it cannot avoid creating becomes an instrument of tyranny and exploitation.

A new loyalty to society as a whole may well be the only alternative to compulsion but how is it to be aroused? Never on the basis of self-interest alone. The citizen will rise to such co-operation only when, educated out of the modern preoccupation with "rights," he sees that man can rise to his full stature only when he recognises his duty to society and discharges it voluntarily and conscientiously. But, on the other hand, the State can claim by moral right the free and full co-operation of its citizens only when even-handed justice is its undeviating aim and its increasing achievement.

Ancient India, the Bulletin of the Archæological Survey of India, the first issue of which bears the date of January 1946, is a welcome experiment in popularising archæological findings. These have too often been buried in learned reports accessible to the scholar but practically unknown to the layman. And such reports are the concern of all of us who inherit the mighty culture to which they bear mute witness. This generously illustrated periodical seems admirably calculated to fulfil the aim stated by the Editor, Dr. R. E. M. Wheeler, as

> to put archaeology regularly on to the bookstalls, and to interest the educated Indian public in current work relating to the exploration and conservation of their great heritage of material culture.

Research in several fields is reported interestingly, and it may seem presumptuous for a layman to suspect the conclusions of sometimes outstripping the evidence. Especially in the matter of chronology, however, speculations are necessarily tentative and reliance for the dating of new findings upon dates previously agreed upon for comparable findings from other sites may but confirm old mistakes.

Especially, too, the tendency to ascribe too much to Greek influence is to be deplored. At least the "northern black polished ware," found at Taxila, is here pronounced mostly pre-Greek. Some exquisitely engraved Taxila gems are, however, ascribed to a Greek craftsman, on what seems very slender evidence. Predilection, whether for Greek culture or Biblical chronology, is a handicap to scientific impartiality.

Principal A. A. A. Fyzee of the Government Law College, Bombay, presented some excellent suggestions for broadening the base of legal education in his address delivered at the Osmania University, Hyderabad, on "The Teaching of Law in Indian Universities" (*The Law College Magazine*, Bombay, 1946, Vol. XV, No. 2). The mind of the legal student must indeed be broadened and deepened, fortified with general knowledge and a wide culture. Especially must he be well acquainted with sociology, politics and economics. There should be some choice as to non-legal subjects, Principal Fyzee maintains, in terms of the career planned and personal predilections. Today, " ...to use a Hindustani

idiom, we drive the whole of the herd with the same stick." The lecture system which now holds the field almost alone ought, he believes, to be supplemented by tutorial work, seminars and something in the nature of moot courts for training in expression.

Principal Fyzee deals facetiously *en passant* with the common man's distrust of law and lawyers, a distrust which persists in spite of the litigious tendencies of India's poor—perhaps because of these. For Gandhiji in *Hind Swaraj* has laid those very tendencies and much besides at the door of lawyers' interest in the multiplying of disputes.

There is no question that proper legal training can increase, as claimed for it by Lord Atkin, the power to weigh evidence, to consider questions on their independent merits, to see the other side and state it fairly. But is there not implicit in this very power the temptation to plead a case against one's own conviction? For gain, to make the worse appear the better cause? Moral training should play a larger part in education generally than it does but in no professional training is emphasis upon personal integrity more indispensable than in the study of the law.

In considering "The Contribution of Religion to Cultural Unity" in Pamphlet 13 of the Edward W. Hazen Foundation, Haddam, Connecticut, Reinhold Niebuhr sees religion as the search for the meaning of life, which must be found "in terms of man's relationship to his total world." The total height and depth of human nature he finds insufficiently taken into account by modern attempts at a comprehensive philosophy.

> ...modern education has progressively explored the multifarious realms of interest in the world and enlarged and disciplined the various vitalities and potentialities of human nature, but has achieved these ends at the price of a loss of the sense of wholeness in the meaning of life and of unity and integration of human purposes.

Even democracy "becomes the centre of an idolatrous religion if it is made the sole end of life." Man's relation to society does not exhaust the meaning of human existence. Nor do any of the scientific disciplines. Nor, it may be added, does Judaism or Roman Catholicism or Protestantism, nor do all of them together. In seeking a religious programme for education which will satisfy Jews, Catholics and Protestants alone, Mr. Niebuhr runs the risk against which he warns, of achieving unity on too shallow a basis. It is the substratum of Truth that underlies *all* faiths which alone can offer an impregnable basis for the integration of the individual and of society.

Analogies may be highly instructive. Such is the comparison drawn by Dr. Caryl P. Haskins in the March *Atlantic Monthly* between man and the social insects. Considering the differences, constitutional as well as anatomical, between insects and men, the points of likeness in their customs and their social structures are astonishing indeed. The facts, however, that ants, like men, "indulge in highly organised mass warfare," keep slaves and domesticate other animals are less significant than other parallels afforded by the insect world with human society.

In the evolution of societies Dr. Haskins sees the trend to increasing

complexity of form paralleled by an ominous pressure to internal integration, to streamlining the individual by weeding out the unfit. Certain biological evidence shows the early loose type of social organisation giving way to the highly regimented form. Does the totalitarian state loom as the end of human social evolution? Even on the ground of his analogy, Dr. Haskins is reassuring. Insect organisation is of two main types: family societies, close-knit and dominating, and associative societies, the constituents of which may not be closely related genetically, and are not strictly regimented. The latter more amorphous grouping, forming, dividing, reuniting, has an immortality not shared by the close-knit group.

Dr. Haskins sees the parallel of the family system in the human family, that of the associative system in human society, a relatively more fluidic system, and the goal in a proper balance between these. The times call for evolving " an entirely new level of human associative living—the world organisation." Hence his title, "Is Mankind Cohesive?"

Fortunately, man is not at the mercy of natural instinct, which, for all its wonders, is limited while the will of man is free. Man has it in his power to evolve a new type of society, that shall be all-embracing and free, in which the highest good of all shall be the aim of each and the welfare of each the sleepless care of all.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was established in 1910 with a gift of ten million dollars from Andrew Carnegie. Its "Thirty-five Years of Service for Abolition of War" have coincided with the two most terrible wars in history. Its record, presented under that title in the Endowment's informative organ, *International Conciliation*, for January, is a significant part of the record of humanity's faltering steps towards world security, not yet attained beyond peradventure but perhaps in sight.

The Endowment has played a varied and important rôle, fact-finding and educational. It has offered scholarships, sponsored conferences, promoted reconstruction after World War I and published hundreds of authoritative volumes on international law, the economic and social history of the first world war etc.

Much of its effort has been directed to enlightening public opinion, by its publications and radio programmes and through its hundreds of International Relations Clubs for college and university students in many countries. It is a pity we have none in India. The lessons of economic as well as of political interdependence need urgently to be brought home through every possible channel. There is no lesson more important for mankind to learn than that the world is one.